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Confronted with lawsuits alleging substandard prison conditions and
court orders to relieve overcrowding, many state and local officials are
now studying the possibilities of contracting out the operation of prisons to
for-profit firms. In a few states, private corporations already operate jails,
and several others are considering enabling legislation in response to this
trend. Such privatization appears to be an attractive policy for ameliorat-
ing the poor state of the American correctional system, reducing its cost to
the public, and providing more efficient management.
Little effort, however, has been made to examine the constitutional im-
plications of delegating correctional authority to private parties.1 After
briefly surveying the development of private prisons, this Note traces the
marked reluctance of the courts to scrutinize the discretionary practices
and decisions of prison officials. It then examines the longstanding hostil-
ity that courts have shown toward standardless delegations of discretion-
ary power to private, for-profit entities and argues that, in the context of
private prisons, continued deference is incompatible with this hostility,
since deferential review would render such facilities especially susceptible
to unreviewed and unremedied abuse. The Note concludes that privatiza-
tion will require not only strict contractual standards, but, more impor-
tantly, greater judicial willingness to review prison practices and to guar-
antee the rights of prisoners.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE PRISONS
The concept of private prisons is not new. In England, private individ-
uals often operated jails for profit.2 In the early years of the United States,
1. This lack of study has led the American Bar Association to call for a moratorium on prison
privatization "until the complex constitutional, statutory and contractual issues are fully developed
and resolved." See N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1986, at A28, col. 3.
2. See L. ORLAND, PRISONS: HousEs OF DARKNESS 17 (1975) (poor conditions "attributable in
large part to the fact that the wardens, keepers, and gaolers (who either purchased their positions or
were rewarded their posts for services rendered) were unpaid by the Crown and, consequently, ex-
acted fees and charges from the inmates"); see also AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, THE AMERI-
CAN PRISON: FROM THE BEGINNING .... 3 (1983) (beginning with Assize of Clarendon's authori-
zation of jail construction in 1166 A.D., jailkeepers extorted fines from inmates and sold them food at
exorbitant prices); cf V. Fox, INTRODUCTION TO CORRECTIONS 384-85 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing
historical role of private individuals and groups in corrections).
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this tradition continued, with private jailers fulfilling a task that the
young nation was initially unable to perform.' By the end of the nine-
teenth century, however, incarceration was increasingly seen as an exclu-
sively governmental function, and the role of private parties in corrections
began to decline." In the Arkansas prison cases, federal judicial interven-
tion eliminated the last great bastion of private involvement in the key
disciplinary aspects of prison life, totally restructuring a penal system
largely because of the profiteering and abuse that the contracting out of
inmate labor had spawned.5
Until recently, private involvement in corrections was limited to the op-
eration of juvenile justice facilities, halfway houses, work-release pro-
grams, and alien detention centers and to the provision of secondary ser-
vices' such as health care, food preparation, educational and vocational
programs, and staff training.7 Faced, however, with rampant overcrowd-
ing,8 bargaining difficulties with guards' unions,9 rejection of prison con-
3. See, e.g., B. McKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 94, 118,
199-203 (1977) (describing leasing of convicts to private parties); Sellin, Correction in Historical
Perspective, in CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 12 (R. Carter, D. Glaser & L. Wilkins eds. 1972)
("[O]ne of the chief elements of punishment has remained the financial exploitation of the prisoner's
manpower. . . . [T]he system of contract labor for the benefit of private employers. . . remained in
many states until twenty-five years ago.").
4. See, e.g., B. McKELVEy, supra note 3, at 111, 126-29 (discussing anti-contract agitation and
growth of state control). Nonetheless, judicial ambivalence on the subject did continue. Compare
People ex rel. Walsh v. Board of Comm'rs, 397 Ill. 293, 301, 74 N.E.2d 503, 508 (1947) (duty to
administer county jail exclusively sherriff's) and Jones Hollow Ware Co. v. Crane, 134 Md. 103, 106
A. 274 (1919) (reserving "custody and maintenance" of convicts to state) with Fox v. Mohawk &
Hudson River Humane Soe'y, 165 N.Y. 517, 524-25, 59 N.E. 353, 355 (1901) (dictum) (legislature
may not delegate to private entities power over "life, liberty, and property of the citizens" except in
areas of eminent domain and "management and control of reformatory institutions").
5. See NATIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL
DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS 35-36, 38 (1977) (hereinafter AFTER DECISION] (discussing
"widescale private use" of convict labor in Arkansas); see also cases cited infra note 19. Some states
now have statutes expressly prohibiting financial interest in convict labor. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. §§
83-443 to -444 (1981) ("No warden. . . guard. . . or other employee. . . shall be in any manner
whatever financially interested in the work or profit of the labor of any convict . . ").
6. This Note focuses on core correctional functions, which involve the discretionary, adjudicative,
and disciplinary practices of prison personnel, rather than on secondary or collateral functions, which
involve the provision of some individual good or service.
7. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS 4-7 (1984); Camp &
Camp, Correctional Privatization in Perspective, 65 PRISON J. 14 (Autumn-Winter 1985) (nation-
wide overview of private sector involvement in prison services); Mullen, Corrections and the Private
Sector, 65 PRISON J. 1 (Autumn-Winter 1985).
8. Approximately 250,000 prisoners are housed in city and county jails. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
1985, at ES, col. 1 (citing U.S. Government statistics). Between 1975 and 1984, the state and federal
prison population increased from 240,593 (111 per 100,000 population) to 463,866 (188 per 100,000
population). Id. It has now swelled to over half a million. Applebome, New Prisoners Are Barred by
Crowded Texas Prisons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at 8, col. 1. Thirty-two states are under court
order to relieve unconstitutional conditions, primarily overcrowding; challenges to conditions of con-
finement are pending in 10 other states. Id. Seventeen percent of the nation's counties are under
similar court order. Elvin, A Civil Liberties View of Private Prisons, 65 PRISON J. 48 (Autumn-
Winter 1985). Some states have been forced to release inmates early in order to comply with court
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struction bonds by the electorate,10 and the rising costs of confinement in
general, 1 state officials 12 have grown sympathetic to the argument that
private enterprise can operate correctional institutions better and more
cheaply than can government." Private for-profit firms now operate ap-
proximately two dozen major facilities,1 ' including at least three medium
or maximum security adult correctional institutions. 5 Moreover, despite
mandated occupancy limits. Applebome, Texas, in Emergency, To Free 185from Crowded Prisons,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1987, at 10, col. 5.
9. See J. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 142-59 (1983) (discuss-
ing collective bargaining and labor disputes in New York state prisons).
10. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1985, at 29, col. I (rejection of prison construction bonds and tax
increases one of factors leading states to seek privatization of overcrowded prison systems); Corrections
and the Private Sector: A National Forum, 1985 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE PROC. 11 [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS] ("only 40 to 50 percent of the initiatives for general obligation bonds receive voter
approval").
11. See Immarigeon, Private Prisons, Private Programs, and Their Implications for Reducing
Reliance on Imprisonment in the United States, 65 PRISON J. 60, 61-64 (Autumn-Winter 1985)
(discussing "fiscal crisis" of American prisons).
12. The overwhelming majority of prisons in the United States are state facilities, and the over-
whelming majority of inmates are state prisoners. Even local jails and detention centers hold more
prisoners than the federal penal system. H. ALLEN & C. SIMONSEN, CORRECGTONS IN AMERICA: AN
INTRODUCTION 523 (2d ed. 1978). Because most local facilities house only misdemeanants and those
awaiting felony adjudication, id. at 442, and because state facilities involve a far greater range of
disciplinary and quasi-adjudicative functions than do local facilities, this Note concentrates primarily
on state penal institutions.
13. See, e.g., Address by Senator Mitch McConnell, National Forum on Corrections and the
Private Sector (Feb. 22, 1985), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 83-84; N.Y. Times,
Aug. 9, 1984, at 4, col. 3 (reporting speech of Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato advocating prison priva-
tization); Prisons for Profit, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1987, at 20, col. 1 (discussing prospective benefits of
prison privatization).
Appeals for private sector involvement in functions traditionally considered "public" in nature have
increased in frequency and intensity, with advocates of privatization expressing confidence that the
pursuit of private gain and the rolling back of state activities further the interests of the larger social
order. The Reagan Administration, for example, has identified 11,000 government activities to be
performed by independent contractors when economically feasible. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1986, at 54,
col. 1. Recently, with official sanction, a number of private firms have assumed prosecutorial and
adjudicative roles previously reserved to the government. See Thompson, Who's Minding the Store?,
STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1986, at 24 (surveying use of private investigatory firms and private attorneys
as de facto law enforcers for copyright infringement and other crimes); N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1986, at
64 (describing private judicial system in California); Public Service, Private Profits, TIME, Feb. 10,
1986, at 64 (discussing "Judicate," private dispute settlement firm); N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1985, at 59,
col. I (describing use of lawyers as part-time magistrates).
14. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at A15, col. 1. Nashville-based Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA), the largest of the prison privatization firms, claims that it now owns or leases nine
facilities containing a total of 1646 beds. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AM., PROSPECTUS 1, 4 (Sept. 1986)
[hereinafter PROSPECTUS].
15. CCA contracts with Hamilton County, Tennessee to operate the 325-bed Silverdale Adult
Detention Center, a facility that houses a considerable number of prisoners serving long terms for
felonies. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1985, at Al4, col. 1. CCA also operates the county jail and work camp
in Bay County, Florida. PROSPECTUS, supra note 14, at 14. Buckingham Security Services, Ltd.
operates the county jail in Butler, Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh Press, Oct. 13, 1985, at A12, col. 1. In
1984, Buckingham proposed to build and operate "Riverhaven," a maximum security prison in Bea-
ver, Pennsylvania, for 720 protective custody inmates from a number of states, and the company still
hopes to contract for a similar facility in Idaho. Interview with Charles Fenton, President, Bucking-
ham Security Services, Ltd., and Warden, Butler County Jail, in Butler, Pa. (Jan. 6, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Fenton Interview].
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criticism from some lawmakers,16 several states hope to contract with pri-
vate firms for prison operations and have enacted, or are considering, leg-
islation authorizing privatization. In light of these developments, the
courts will now have to decide cases arising in correctional facilities in
which not only the cafeterias and classrooms, but the hearing rooms and
cellblocks themselves, are staffed by corporate personnel. The current ju-
dicial approach, reluctance to rigorously scrutinize internal prison proce-
dures, is, however, unequal to this task.
II. DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC PRISON
PROCEDURES AND THE WIDE DISCRETION OF PRISON PERSONNEL
A. Deference
In reviewing complaints of unconstitutional prison practices, the courts
long adhered to a "hands-off" approach, refusing altogether to examine
alleged violations on the premise that prisoner rights were nonexistent.18
In the areas of inhumane conditions or treatment (which fall under the
Eighth Amendment) 9 and practices that are facially discriminatory or vi-
16. Telephone interview with Representative David Wright, Pennsylvania House of Representa-
tives (Dec. 17, 1985) (legislator in whose district privately operated minimum security facility is lo-
cated expresses reservations about privatization).
17. Texas, which does not yet have a privatized correctional facility, has a brief enabling statute
that authorizes counties to contract for the incarceration of low-risk inmates in private detention facili-
ties, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5115d(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986), and New Mexico has a statu-
tory scheme that authorizes the Governor and the Legislature to direct the Department of Corrections
to contract with private firms for the operation of any minimum security facility. N.M. STAT. ANN. §
33-1-17 (Cum. Supp. 1986). The Tennessee Legislature is now considering a bill to negotiate with
private firms for the operation of a medium-security work camp. Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1986, at 38,
col. 1. In December, 1985, the Tennessee Legislature passed a statute, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3-15-
101 to -108 (1985), establishing a Select Oversight Committee on Corrections, one of whose duties is
to review the possibilities for "[p]rovision of services, facilities or programs by private contractors." Id.
at § 3-15-107. In March, 1985, the National Governors' Association passed a resolution declaring
that states might wish to explore the possibilities of prison privatization, and several governors pub-
licly expressed their eagerness to do so. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1985 at 35, col. 1. In March, 1986, the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed the Private Prison Moratorium and Study Act, Act
No. 1986-19, 1986 Pa. Legis. Serv. 7 (Purdon) (to be codified at 61 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1081-1085),
imposing a one year ban on privatization (existing facilities are specifically exempted) and establish-
ing a Private Prison Task Force to study and conduct hearings on the issue.
18. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) (convict is "the slave
of the State").
19. Perhaps the best illustration of the hands-on approach in the Eighth Amendment context is
that provided by the Arkansas prison litigation, which extended from 1965 until 1982, and in which
successive federal courts intervened to remedy grave abuses in that state's penal system. See, e.g., Holt
v. Sarver [Holt II], 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970) ("dark and evil" world of Arkansas
penitentiary facilities unconstitutional on Eighth Amendment grounds), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971) (finding additional unconstitutional conditions); Holt v. Sarver [Holt I], 300 F. Supp. 825
(E.D. Ark. 1969) (holding conditions of confinement in prison system violative of Eighth Amend-
ment); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (permanently enjoining use of "Tucker
Telephone" electric shock device, teeter board, and whipping; restraining use of "strap"), vacated in
part on other grounds, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). Entire prison systems in other states also have
been deemed violative of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.
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olative of First Amendment rights, 0 however, the courts have all but
abandoned this approach in favor of a "hands-on" readiness to hear and
redress prisoner complaints,"1 even when remedies require courts to su-
pervise long-term restructuring of large state prison bureaucracies.2 2
Nonetheless, in areas profoundly affecting the Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interests and process rights of prison inmates, the courts have con-
tinued to accord broad deference to the judgment of prison personnel.13
This deference reflects an increasingly positivist conception of due process
rights-that only interests specifically created by statute or practice merit
judicial protection4-a recognition of correctional officers' expertise,2 5
1982) (Texas), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I.
1977) (Rhode Island); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (Alabama), affd
and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied in perti-
nent part, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); cf. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (New York
City), affd in part, remanded on other grounds, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
20. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (guaranteeing freedom of expression in
case involving prison censorship); id. at 428 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("When the prison gates slam
behind an inmate, he does not lose his human quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his
intellect does not cease to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions .... "); Bryant v. McGin-
nis, 463 F. Supp. 373 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (guaranteeing Muslims right to practice faith). But see Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (warden may constitutionally bar
union meetings).
21. There is some evidence, however, that the Supreme Court's attitude remains ambivalent. See,
e.g., Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-16 (1981) ("nobody promised them [prisoners] a rose
garden"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (negligent medical treatment by prison medical staff
not cruel and unusual punishment); Bronstein, Prisoners and Their Endangered Rights, 65 PRsSON
J. 3, 4 (Spring-Summer 1985) ("[T]he Burger-Rehnquist Court has moved us, though not full circle
back to the slave-of-the-state era, two-thirds of the way back.").
22. See 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 528-752 (2d ed. 1984) (case study of extensive
judicial use of injunctive power to oversee reform of entire Arkansas prison system throughout
seventeen-year period of litigation).
23. See generally Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L.
REv. 795 (1969):
Prisoners often have their privileges revoked, are denied the right of access to counsel, sit in
solitary or maximum security or lose accrued "good time" on the basis of a single, unreviewed
report of a guard. When the courts defer to administrative discretion, it is this guard to whom
they delegate the final word on reasonable prison practices. This is the central evil in prison
. . . the unreviewed administrative discretion granted to the poorly trained personnel who deal
directly with prisoners.
Id. at 811-12 (footnote omitted).
24. See Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others
Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 482, 570-74 (1984) (arguing that liberty interests,
unlike property rights, should be defined and safeguarded according to Constitution, not state law);
Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 447-49, 457-70 (1977) (despite demise of right-privilege distinction, plain-
tiff must show entitlement cognizable in positive law); Note, The Procedural Due Process Approach
to Administrative Discretion: The Courts' Inverted Analysis, 95 YALE L.J. 1017, 1021-22 (1986)
(noting irony that courts afford full due process protection when state statute or practice specially
regulates procedures of prisons or other public bodies, but feel no such obligation when state affords
such bodies "unfettered discretion").
25. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) ("[T]he inquiry of federal courts into prison
management must be limited to the issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition of
the Constitution or, in the case of a federal prison, a statute. The wide range of 'judgment calls' that
meet constitutional a7A statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch
of Government.").
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and a belief in the utility of governmental delegation in the administrative
state.26
In Procunier v. Martinez,2 7 the Supreme Court, while finding that of-
ficial censorship stated a colorable First Amendment claim, nonetheless
expounded a deferential approach that it has since chosen to follow in
cases involving Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests and process
rights:
Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order
and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized
access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human
nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their
custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these du-
ties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the
problems of prisons in America are complex . . they are not read-
ily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, com-
prehensive planning, and the committment of resources, all of which
are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government. . . . [C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with
the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration .... 28
This rationale frees prison personnel to exercise virtually unfettered dis-
cretion over the day to day conditions of confinement, short of engaging in
the most egregiously abusive practices. Reasoning that corrections person-
nel are best situated to adopt and execute policies necessary for institu-
tional order, the Court has held that staff members may isolate inmates,29
restrict their incoming mail,30 determine how many beds a cell will hold,
31
prohibit contact visits,3 2 and limit eligibility for rehabilitation programs.
33
26. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.00-2 to -3 (Supp. 1970) (discussing
cases which show failure of non-delegation doctrine).
27. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
28. Id. at 404-05 (footnote omitted).
29. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1983).
30. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549-55 (1979), the Court upheld prison rules that prohib-
ited pretrial detainees from receiving packages and from receiving books other than from publishers or
book stores. But ef. Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1985) (right to receive publications, a
legitimate liberty interest, not hazardous to institutional security), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 788 (1986).
31. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 541-43 (double-bunking does not violate detainees' due process right to
be free from preadjudicative punishment).
32. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (upholding city jail's blanket prohibition of contact
visits for pre-trial detainees on grounds of need for institutional discipline and security).
33. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 1 (1976) (inmates had no due process or statutory entitlement to
challenge government discretion, granted by 18 U.S.C. § 4081 (1982), in determining eligibility for
prison rehabilitation programs).
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B. Discretion
Disciplinary rules in correctional facilities are made in an informal and
discretionary way. Prisons are "total institutions" where guards deter-
mine, on an everyday basis, what inmates may and may not do.34 By stat-
ute or by practice, most states authorize prison wardens to draft institu-
tional rules, 5 and provide few statewide regulations for institutional
discipline."6 Because of a willingness to rely on the training and expertise
of correctional officers, the courts3 7 and the state legislatures 8 leave the
enforcement of these rules to the discretion of prison staff.
Prison staff also exercise substantial effective control over the duration
and terms of confinement through a broad range of adjudicative functions.
Line officers' recommendations influence parole examiners' assessments of
the likelihood that an inmate will violate parole conditions or the law
upon release.8 At disciplinary hearings, prison personnel assess behavior,
determine guilt or innocence, and impose sanctions. 40 In these hearings, as
in proceedings regarding parole release, inmate transfer, administrative
34. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 7-9 (1961) (analyzing restrictions placed on inmates by staff in
total institutions); L. ORLAND, supra note 2, at 66-69 (describing and criticizing "pervasive system of
authoritarian rules, covering every aspect of institutional life"); G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAP-
TiVES xiv-xvi, 23-25 (1958) (discussing regimentation and control in maximum security prison).
35. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185(1) (1981) ("The chief executive officer of each facility
shall be responsible for the discipline of those . . . who reside therein.").
36. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 542 n.1 (1974).
37. The courts have subjected such discretion only to the limited review provided by Wolff and its
progeny. See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712-13 (7th Cir. 1973) (" 'Lib-
erty' and 'custody' are not mutually exclusive concepts. . . . [T]his does not mean, however, that
every decision by prison officials should be subject to judicial review or that the courts rather than
experienced administrators should write prison regulations.").
38. For example, pursuant to statute, NEB REV. STAT. §§ 83-185, -1107 (1981), prison authori-
ties in Nebraska have formulated regulations providing for (a) preparation of misconduct reports by
line officers, (b) investigation by shift lieutenants, and (c) review and further investigation by chief
corrections officers or supervisors. The regulations further provide that all information obtained in the
investigation is to be noted in the guard's report, and that the disciplinary review committee is to
consider this document in imposing sanctions. NEBRASKA PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX
PENITENTIARY UNIT GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURE: INMATE CONTROL, MISCONDUCT, AND
THE ADJUSTMENT (1971), reprinted in McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 646 app. Q (D. Neb.
1972), af d in part, rev'd in part, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973), affid in part, rev'd in part, 418
U.S. 539 (1974).
39. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1114(2)(1) (1981) (listing as factor "the offender's conduct in
the [correctional] facility"); see also L. ORLAND, supra note 2, at 77 ("triple jeopardy" to inmate's
freedom since same committee that orders punishment also has power to revoke good time and to
report misconduct to parole board); cf 28 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (1986) (federal hearing examiners specifi-
cally authorized to treat findings of Institution Disciplinary Committee as "conclusive evidence of
institutional misconduct").
40. Hearing committees often include line officers as well as supervisory personnel and are em-
powered to weigh guards' reports on any use of force, occurrence of injury, or other circumstance of
an infraction. See L. ORLAND, supra note 2, at 74 ("adjustment committee" in New York State
Penitentiary at Attica could include line officers as well as civilian employees); G. HAWKINS, THE
PRISON 142-43 (1976) (describing wide administrative discretion in internal prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings); c. Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units, 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.14-541.18 (1985) (staff
members may sit on Institution Discipline Committees).
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segregation, and good time credits, the Supreme Court has determined
that prisoners' liberty interests are diminished and that due process rights
attach, for the most part, only to those entitlements specifically created by
state law or practice.41
Correctional personnel exercise wide discretion over inmates' liberty in-
terests in other areas of prison life as well. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently upheld guards' intrusions on inmates' privacy against both due
process and Fourth Amendment challenges, again premising its deference
on the institutional security rationale.4 2 The Court has also held recently
that, absent a showing of intent or deliberate indifference, a prison offi-
cial's mere negligence or lack of due care that results in injury to an in-
mate does not constitute a due process deprivation.43
III. JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO PRIVATE, FOR-PROFIT DELEGATIONS
In a private prison, these adjudicative and rulemaking functions that
courts have traditionally left to the broad discretion of prison of-
ficers-implicating core liberty interests-will now be exercised by pri-
vate employees. One must therefore inquire whether the deference paid
prison officials is compatible with the rules which courts have applied in
assessing the validity of delegations to private parties with potential finan-
cial biases.
41. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (inmates not entitled to appointed counsel
while in administrative segregation and before initiation of adversary proceedings); Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (interstate prison transfers, even across 4000 miles of ocean, impli-
cate no liberty interest); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (informal, nonadversarial evidentiary
review before isolating inmate satisfies due process); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S.
1 (1979) (full hearing rights not required for parole release decision; while parole revocation requires
process due one already at liberty, release requires only proeess due one who merely desires such
liberty); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976) (due process does not require pre-transfer
hearing or limit prison officials' discretion as to transfers); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
559-72 (1974) (only limited due process protections required at disciplinary hearings and good time
proceedings; same rationale as Greenholtz); Brown v. Frey, 40 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2285 (8th Cir.
Dec. 24, 1986) (cursory statement referring to investigatory reports sufficient notice of evidence relied
upon by disciplinary board in depriving prisoner of liberty interest); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185(2)
(1981) (misconduct punishment shall be deprivation of privileges, but warden may revoke statutory
good time in cases of serious or flagrant misconduct); Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good
Time, 30 UCLA L. REv. 217, 221-24, 237 (1982) (most states award good time subject only to good
behavior, but courts hold good time may be summarily revoked).
42. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 530-36 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate's
property during shakedown search violated neither Fourth Amendment nor due process since the
former "does not apply within the confines of the prison cell" and since, in satisfaction of the latter,
inmate had adequate post-deprivation remedies under state law); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
556-61 (1979) (upholding visual body cavity searches of pre-trial detainees and routine shakedown
searches of their cells; citing detainees' diminished privacy interests and requirements of institutional
security); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 574-77 (sanctioning state's practice of opening and in-
specting mail from attorneys).
43. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
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A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Article I, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States.""' Strictly interpreted, this clause prohibits Congress from
delegating its legislative powers to any other institution or party, 45 but,
with the expansion of the administrative state and the concomitant need
for bureaucratic discretion, the principle of per se nondelegability has
been widely criticized as moribund,4 and the courts have long ceased to
employ it to invalidate delegations of rulemaking and adjudicative author-
ity to public bodies.47 Intermittently, Supreme Court decisions have ex-
pressed concern with the breadth of such delegation,48 but they have gen-
erally manifested this concern by narrowly construing statutes conferring
power on the Executive, rather than by mandating strict standards for
their implementation. 49 In addition to its general deference to administra-
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
45. The idea that Congress retains nondelegable powers first appeared, as dictum, in Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825):
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be
entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provi-
sion may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to
fill up the details.
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. The nondelegation doctrine itself was first, and most rigidly, articulated by
the Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892), though even there the Court upheld a statu-
tory provision authorizing the President to make tariff determinations. Id. at 692-93; see also Carter
v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating statute delegating wage- and hour-setting powers to
private coal producers); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935)
(invalidating portion of National Recovery Act allowing President to set standards for firm competi-
tion upon recommendation of majority of firms in industry); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935) (invalidating law granting President power to prevent interstate transfer of "hot oil").
46. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 26, § 2.00 ("The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete
failure."); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 581
(1947) ("[I]nsistence on the doctrine of the Schechter case might again provoke a constitutional cri-
sis. . . .Realistically considered Schechter has been put in the museum of constitutional history.");
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 81 (1985) (nondelegation theory "quite weak").
In the last few years, however, a growing number of commentators have argued for a revival of the
nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-98 (2d ed. 1979) (criticizing
broad delegation as "policy without law"); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 65 (1982) (arguing for renewal of doctrine under which "the
judiciary would nullify all delegations of legislative authority"); Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doc-
trine: Could the Court Give It Some Substance?, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (1985) (same).
47. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 774-87 (1948) (rejecting nondelegation chal-
lenge to Renegotiation Act of 1942, which provided for broad administrative power to determine
"excessive profits" recoverable on war subcontracts); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424
(1944) (distinguishing Schechter as case where "[tihe function of formulating the codes was delegated
...to private individuals engaged in the industries to be regulated").
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A),(B) (1982), provides federal courts with
independent statutory authority to invalidate overbroad delegations.
48. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (remanding to Secretary of Labor to establish narrower standards for OSHA rule
application).
49. E.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974) (Congress
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tive expertise,50 the Court's permissiveness toward legislative delegation
probably derives from a hesitance to contravene congressional policy based
on what it considers to be vague Article I or separation of powers con-
cerns in the abstract-that is, absent a specific showing that an enumer-
ated provision of the Constitution has been violated.51
B. De Facto Application of the Nondelegation Doctrine to Private, For-
Profit Entities Through the Due Process Clause
In the narrow context of delegations of governmental functions to pri-
vate, for-profit entities, however, both federal and state courts have effec-
tively preserved the nondelegation principle.52 In the landmark case of
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,53 the Supreme Court held Con-
gress' delegation to private groups of authority to set codes of industrial
competition "utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and
duties of Congress"" because of the danger that profit-seeking might in-
fluence the rulemaking process:
But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as
to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and benefi-
cent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries?
...The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is
unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitu-
tional prerogatives and duties of Congress.5"
should not be presumed to have delegated taxing authority conferred on it by Article I). But cf
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vague statute impermissibly delegated
basic policy matters to law enforcement personnel for ad hoc and subjective decisions, thereby risking
abuse); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (laundry licensing scheme giving board of county
supervisors unconstrained discretion and not providing standards violates Fourteenth Amendment).
50. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965) (Secretary of State has wide discretion in
issuing passports).
51. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 855 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]t is by no
means dear to me in what part of the Federal Constitution we are to find the prohibition of state-
authorized self-regulation of and by an economic group that the Schechter case found in Article I as
respects the Federal Government."); cf Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dis-
senting) ("Appeal is vaguely made to some constitutional immunity, whether express or implied is not
stated with distinctness. . . .If the immunity rests upon some express provision of the Constitution,
the opinion of the Court does not point us to the article or section.").
52. The constitutional roots of this principle lie in the Court's traditional hostility, derived from
common law, to statutes that give private parties the power to control or coerce the actions of others.
See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-23 (1928) (invalidating
municipal zoning ordinance that gave neighbors veto power over property owner's choice of land use;
explicitly finding danger of bias and self-interest violates due process); Eubank v. City of Richmond,
226 U.S. 137 (1912) (striking down similar enactment that conferred power to establish building
setback lines on owners of abutting property).
53. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
54. Id. at 537.
55. Id.
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Although the Schechter doctrine of invalidating delegations on vague
Article I grounds without specific reference to enumerated constitutional
provisions has retained vitality in a few states,5" most federal and state
courts have relied on a due process rationale instead.57 In particular,
courts have advanced three criteria for scrutinizing the vesting of discre-
tionary governmental powers in private, for-profit individuals or groups.
First, the Supreme Court has long evinced a hostility toward the dele-
gation of discretionary or adjudicative powers5" to financially interested
parties, explicitly rejecting the argument that its review should focus only
on actual bias and invalidating such delegations as per se violations of due
56. See, e.g., People ex rel. Rudman v. Rini, 63 Ill. 2d 321, 356 N.E.2d 4 (1976) (statute author-
izing political party to fill county office vacancies unconstitutional delegation of sovereign power of
state to private groups; such power delegable, if at all, only to public agency); Gamel v. Veterans
Memorial Auditorium Comm'n, 272 N.W.2d 472 (Iowa 1978) (statute providing that veterans orga-
nizations choose commissioners for memorial buildings and monuments impermissibly delegated legis-
lative authority to private groups to extent it gave private groups powers of public appointment and
expenditure); Hetherington v. McHale, 458 Pa. 479, 486, 329 A.2d 250, 254 (1974) (invalidating
statute giving three companies near majority of committee charged with disbursing public funds; "stat-
utory standards provide no substitute for the processes of representative government . ").
57. This choice has had the effect of making constitutional restrictions on private delegations
equally applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, a result which would not have
arisen under a per se Article I ban. See, e.g., Licbmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American
Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 652-53, 654 n.16 (1975) (due process "doing some of the work
formerly done by the nondelegation doctrine"); K. DAvis, supra note 26, §§ 2.00 to 2.00-6 (arguing
for due process-nondelegation merger); see also United States v. McGautha, 402 U.S. 183, 272-73
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "candor compels recognition that our cases regarding the dele-
gation by Congress of lawmaking power do not always say what they seem to mean"; arguing that
"[wihatever the sources of the [nondelegation] doctrine, its application to the States as a matter of due
process is merely a reflection of the fundamental principles of due process").
58. Several commentators have argued for a distinction between adjudicative and rulemaking
functions: that the Court, where laws have delegated rulemaking authority to private parties, should
validate such delegation on the reasoning that it is prospective in nature and general in application
and hence carries less of a risk of vindictiveness or abuse than the delegation of adjudicative authority,
which operates retrospectively and applies to particular circumstances or individuals. See, e.g., K.
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.15 (1958) ("[T]he safeguards required for adjudication
are greater than those required for general rule making."); Liebmann, supra note 57, at 659-65,
682-83 (abuses of licensing powers more dangerous than abuses of rulemaking powers). Two Su-
preme Court decisions seem to accept the proffered distinction. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,
18-19 (1979) (rejecting claim that alleged bias in rulemaking only; claimant produced no evidence of
"any disciplinary proceeding against him."); Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ.
Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (upholding layoffs of striking teachers, since decision based on school
board policy, not on adjudication).
Even in the area of delegation to public parties, however, this distinction has been murky at best.
See Elrod, The Effect of Procedural Due Process on State and Local Governmental Decisionmaking:
Beyond Roth and Eastlake, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 679, 706 & n.204, 709-10 (1982) (discussing
several instances in which distinction wholly formalistic). Compare South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt,
491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (procedural due process did not apply because rezoning decision
"legislative"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 (1974) with Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or.
574, 580-81, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973) (zoning change affecting "a specific piece of property" is "usu-
ally an exercise of judicial authority"). There is no apparent reason why, in the area of delegations to
private parties, the distinction should be any more discernible. In any event, even if viable as a general
proposition, the distinction is moot in the prison context, since the discretionary nature of a correc-
tional officer's job gives it a clearly adjudicative aspect, whatever rulemaking element it possesses as
well. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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process upon a finding of threatened abuse alone. 9 In Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.,10 decided only a few months after Schechter, the Supreme Court
invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 (delegating to
private producers the power to regulate work hours and wages), pointing
to the same intolerable combination of unaccountability and financial self-
interest6" that it had disapproved in Schechter, but advancing as its ration-
ale the fact that the Act's delegation "deprived petitioners of rights safe-
guarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 2
In Fuentes v. Shevin,63 the Court held unconstitutional, on due process
grounds, statutes permitting a private party summarily to obtain a pre-
judgment writ of replevin and to compel the sheriff to seize property in
execution of the writ. Again, the Court was concerned with the abdication
of effective state power to profit seekers, citing a special danger when pri-
vate parties seeking private gain can invoke state power.64 In several cases,
the Court has expressly distinguished between the conflicts of interest
which the vesting of public authority in private, profit-seeking hands cre-
ates and the tolerable possibility that public agency administrators may
have previous exposure, experience, or opinions concerning matters over
59. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (judge with financial inter-
est in case had to recuse himself in civil proceeding; test is whether circumstances "would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge. . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true")
(emphasis added) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-32 (1927) (criminal case; same hold-
ing)); see also Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1585 (1986) (Alabama Supreme Court
Justice violated due process and effectively acted as "a judge in his own case" by failing to recuse
himself in case where he had "direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest") (quoting Ward, 409
U.S. at 60; Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523); id. at 1590 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The participation of a
judge who has a substantial interest in the outcome of a case of which he knows at the time he
participates necessarily imports a bias into the deliberative process."); Wolkenstein v. Reville, 694
F.2d 35, 42 (2d Cir. 1982) (explicitly applying Tumey test)). Those delegations to private, for-profit
entities that the Court has upheld have involved circumstances where the private role has remained
subordinate to a preeminent public involvement, such as statutes providing for approval of govern-
mental market controls by producers, United States v. Rock Royal Coop. Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 578
(1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939), and for the nonbinding proposal of minimum
prices by industry boards, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940).
60. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
61. Id. at 311 ("This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delega-
tion to an official or official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests
may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.").
62. Id.; see also Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 614 (1937) (upholding Virginia
statute creating state milk marketing board with authority to fix minimum rates; due process violated
not by delegation to official agencies but by delegation to private entities "with arbitrary capacity to
make their will prevail as law").
63. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
64. Id. at 81, 93 ("The statutes ... abdicate effective state control over state power. Private
parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods
from another."); accord Perez v. Campbell, 403 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating law which allowed
judgment creditors of motorists involved in automobile accidents to initiate suspension (and consent to
restoration) of drivers' licenses); cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1975) (uphold-
ing delegation to Indian tribes of power to control liquor licensing on their reservations since such
tribes lawful, quasi-governmental delegates; expressly distinguishing tribes from unauthorized private
parties).
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which they exercise adjudicative discretion.6 5 State courts, moreover, ap-
plying their own constitutional provisions, have been even more emphatic
in invalidating potentially abusive and profiteering delegations on due
process grounds.6"
The second criterion that courts have applied in reviewing delegations
of discretionary power to private groups is whether such delegation
threatens fundamental rights or sensitive liberty interests.67 The Supreme
Court has long refused to countenance the exploitation of convicts by pri-
vate employers,6" and courts have struck down statutes empowering pri-
65. Compare Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1973) (Alabama Board of Optometry, com-
posed entirely of private practitioners, not sufficiently impartial entity to adjudicate allegedly "unpro-
fessional conduct" of salaried optometrists employed by private corporation since practitioners had
personal economic stake in determination which discouraged corporate practice of optometry) with
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (granting strong presumption of impartiality to public
investigative and adjudicative board but explicitly affirming more severe treatment given to private
deliberative entities) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (demand that administrative
agencies separate functions "assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures designed,
and working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity"; citing need for
officials to act in several different capacities).
66. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 153 Cal. App. 3d 109, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1984) (California New Motor Vehicle Board prima fade unconstitutional, on due process
grounds, since four of nine Board members had heavy financial interests in Board's determinations);
Colorado Energy Advocacy Office v. Public Serv. Co., 704 P.2d 298 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (private
control of utility ratemaking); Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 228 Kan. 579, 618 P.2d
837 (1980) (delegation of licensing authority to private professional association); Boston Milk Produc-
ers, Inc. v. Halperin, 446 A.2d 33 (Me. 1982) (delegation of taxing authority to private group); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 151 N.E.2d 631 (Mass. 1958) (scheme providing for self-regulation of barber
shop hours); Coffman v. State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 331 Mich. 582, 50 N.W.2d 322
(1951) (delegation to professional group of power to set standards for admission to practice of optome-
try); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978)
(self-serving collective bargaining agreement); Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93
N.E.2d 632 (1950) (property owners' veto of educational use permits); Ohio Motor Licensing v.
Memphis Auto Sales, 142 N.E.2d 268, 275 (Ohio 1957) (statutes granting corporate-franchised deal-
ers monopoly on sale of new cars); In re Stanley, 204 Pa. Super. 29, 32, 201 A.2d 287, 289 (1964)
(practice under which individual vested with special powers of constable functioned simultaneously as
private detective); Jennings v. Exeter W. Greenwich Regional School Dist. Comm., 116 R.I. 90, 97,
352 A.2d 634, 638 (1976) (statutory scheme delegating control over public school district busing);
House of Seagram, Inc. v. Assam Drug Co., 176 N.W.2d 491, 495 (S. Dak. 1970) ("the legislature
may not delegate to private persons discretionary power to fix wages, prices or rates"); United Chiro-
practors of Washington, Inc. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 1, 578 P.2d 38 (1978) (en banc) (delegation of
licensing and disciplining authority to private practitioners).
67. This criterion is based on substantive due process principles which protect basic rights and
values deemed not to derive from the state. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to procure
abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to receive contraception). In the pri-
vate prison context, these fundamental rights are implicated by private personnel adjudicating in-
mates' (concededly limited) liberty interests. See infra text accompanying notes 85-90.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (state statute allowing private em-
ployers to hire convicts as laborers without fixing any limits on power of employer over convicts
violates 13th Amendment); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944):
[I]n general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment is the
right to change employers. When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the
obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a
harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.
Id. at 18.
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vate parties to enact penal laws, 9 to control a city police department, 70 to
maintain and take custody of state convicts, 71 and to impair constitutional
rights of expression in public areas of a company town. 72 In two fre-
quently cited opinions involving the vesting of discretionary power in pub-
lic entities, Justice Brennan has argued for a limited reinvocation of the
nondelegation principle (along due process lines) where sensitive liberty
interests are at stake.73
The third criterion is the absence of standards governing private delega-
tions.7 ' The due process test for delegation of power is most often mani-
fested in the requirement of sharply articulated standards guarding
against abuse of discretion: a "clear statement"7 5 by the legislature of
what the delegate's authority is to be. In Todd & Co. v. SEC,78 the Third
Circuit outlined the safeguards necessary to protect a statute delegating
regulatory power over a securities market to private entities against invali-
dation on due process grounds; the statute was upheld because it required
the organizations concerned to adopt detailed rules.7 7 The New York
Court of Appeals has twice struck down statutes vesting licensing powers
over harness racing in private groups without providing standards," and
the New Jersey Supreme Court has invalidated a statute delegating to a
medical society, a private corporation, the power to determine who may
practice medicine in the state.7 9
69. E.g., Bayside Timber Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971)
(statute delegating to timber owners power to enact forest laws); Olinger v. People, 140 Colo. 397,
344 P.2d 689 (1959) (en banc) (statute delegating to private citizens organized in "soil conservation
district" power to decide that landowner commits crime when he breaks sod for planting). For cases
invalidating such delegations to public parties, see Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1974)
(statute authorizing state agency to determine criminal penalties associated with controlled substance
offenses); State v. Jaramillo, 83 N.M. 800, 801, 498 P.2d 687, 689 (1972) (statute authorizing custo-
dian of public property to request anyone to leave who, in his judgment, was using property "contrary
to its intended or customary use" and made refusal to obey criminal offense).
70. City of Covington v. Covington Lodge No. 1, 622 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1981) (compulsory arbi-
tration clause in police union's contract unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to arbitrator).
71. See supra note 4.
72. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (state cannot punish person for distributing religious
literature on premises of company-owned town).
73. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 272 nn.21-22 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stat-
ute which delegated to jury power to impose death penalty but did not propose guidelines violated due
process); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("area
of permissible indefiniteness [of standards] narrows . . . when the regulation invokes criminal sanc-
tions and potentially affects fundamental rights").
74. This third criterion derives from the procedural branch of due process which, under the anal-
ysis of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975), invalidates any state action that deprives a person of
a protected life, liberty, or property interest without due process of law.
75. For a discussion of this test, see Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Polic)making:
Notes on Three Doctrines, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer, 1976, at 46, 66.
76. 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1973).
77. Id. at 1015-16.
78. Murtha v. Monaghan, 4 N.Y.2d 897, 151 N.E.2d 83 (1958); Fink v. Cole, 302 N.Y. 216, 97
N.E.2d 873 (1951).
79. Such power, wrote the Court, could not be delegated to a
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IV. APPLYING THE DUE PROCESS STANDARD IN PRIVATE PRISONS
This judicial hostility to delegations that pose a risk of abuse by for-
profit entities is incompatible with the deference that courts pay to correc-
tional officials. With the advent of private prisons,, this tension is no
longer merely hypothetical.80 Any privatization of disciplinary and discre-
tionary functions in prisons will allow personnel paid and managed by
private corporations to impose rules upon inmates convicted by the state.
Private prisons implicate each of the three nondelegation concerns out-
lined above: financial bias, impingement on fundamental rights, and ab-
sence of standards. Application of these three criteria thus becomes neces-
sary to determine the permissible scope of prison privatization.
A. The Danger of Financial Bias in Prison Management
Even if constitutional in the public sector,81 judicial deference to every-
day prison decisionmaking by private, for-profit firms is unwarranted and
cannot be squared with the courts' longstanding presumption against the
vesting of discretionary and coercive authority in financially interested
parties. While state prison authorities may be inept or worse, they lack
the incentives to raise prices and reduce quality which characterize a for-
profit firm.82 Because a nonprofit entity like the state cannot pocket its
profits,83 it is less likely than a for-profit delegate to seek to maximize
private Board which ... is not subject to public accountability, at least where the exercise of
such power is not accompanied by adequate legislative standards or safeguards whereby an
application may be protected against arbitrary or self-motivated action on the part of such
private body.
Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 445, 193 A.2d 103, 108 (1963); see also Maryland Coop.
Milk Producers v. Miller, 170 Md. 81, 84, 182 A. 432, 435 (1936) (invalidating vesting of power in
Milk Control Commission since delegation was not to a "described locality, but to an indefinite por-
tion of producer, consumer, and distributor classes in areas having no legislative description"); Salt
Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977) (invalidating regulations
for lack of standards and safeguards).
80. Of course, it might be argued that this tension is a straw man; it is possible that the courts
would not apply the same deferential standard to private prisons as to public facilities. However,
absent any indication to the contrary, there is no reason to be confident that judges will make a proper
distinction and depart from the posture of extreme deference. This Note aims to demonstrate the
nonviability of such a posture in light of the courts' own precedents.
81. But see Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 23, at 811-12 (delegation of "final word on
reasonable prison practices" and "unreviewed administrative discretion" to "poorly trained personnel
who deal directly with prisoners" violates Constitution); see also L. ORLAND, supra note 2, at 77
(citing "inherent conflict between prison and law").
82. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 844 (1980) (distin-
guishing nonprofit and for-profit corporations).
83. Professor Hansmann has labeled this limitation the "distribution constraint":
The nonprofit producer, like its for-profit counterpart, has the capacity to raise prices and cut
quality in such cases without much fear of customer reprisal; however, it lacks the incentive to
do so because those in charge are barred from taking home any resulting profits. In other
words, the advantage of a nonprofit producer is that the discipline of the market is supple-
mented by the additional protection given the consumer by another, broader "contract," the
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profits at the expense of duty. The identity and nature of the entity af-
fording-indeed creating-or denying process rights partially determines
what process is adequate or due; the judge with a pecuniary bias in a
case, the licensing board member with a financial interest in excluding
applicants, and the constable seeking clients for his private detective busi-
ness bring to their tasks a bias which demands procedural checks.
Process rights and service delivery are expensive, and a cost-conscious
manager in the employ of a for-profit firm will have an interest in limit-
ing both. The courts' unwillingness to impose procedural checks on prison
officials' decisions regarding discipline, parole, good time, inmate transfer,
and eligibility for rehabilitative programs may lead to abuses by private
contractors seeking to increase profits and cut costs by lengthening
sentences, lumping offenders in distant, multistate facilities,"' and limiting
services provided to inmates. Reductions in the quality of health care, edu-
cational and vocational opportunities, and food services are more probable
immediate responses, because they impinge less directly on liberty inter-
ests and thus are less likely to give rise to litigation. Both sorts of abuse
can be expected, however, especially after the initial "honeymoon" pe-
riod-in which a private contractor will seek to demonstrate its intention
to meet, and perhaps even surpass, its contractual standards-has passed.
B. Fundamental Interests and Private Prisons
In prisons, the state exercises total control over human life. Inmates are
at the mercy of the government, and must depend on prison personnel for
their protection. The sensitivity of prisoners' rights, however diminished
those rights may be by virtue of a criminal conviction, lies in the fact that,
like children in an orphanage or nursing home patients, inmates are invol-
untary wards of the state, consumers without choice.85 They are in no
position to assess the services they receive or the rights they are accorded.
In this setting, the liberty interests and fundamental rights that may inval-
idate private delegations thus take on special significance.8" One sentenced
to prison by a judge should not have his liberty interest adjudicated anew
for institutional purposes by a private corporation, but that is what al-
lowing private contractors into a penal system largely devoid of due pro-
organization's legal commitment to devote its entire earnings to the production of services. As a
result of this institutional constraint, it is less imperative for the consumer either to shop
around first or to enforce rigorously the contract he makes.
Id.
84. See supra note 15 (Buckingham Security's plans to operate multistate facilities).
85. See Hansmann, supra note 82, at 844 (discussing situations in which consumers of services
have no choice from whom they will procure services).
86. See Mashaw, supra note 46, at 93-94 (arguing that only delegations implicating these rights
merit strict review).
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cess guarantees would do. 17 Because prisons are beyond the ken of the
everyday political and legal processes of society, and because inmates' due
process rights are diminished in general, those vestiges of liberty that do
persist-in particular the freedom from unjustified intrusions on personal
integrity8" and the right to safe conditions of confinement and security
from attack by other inmates89-merit jealous protection."
C. The Necessity-and Insufficiency-of Strict Contractual Standards
Strict standards are necessary to regulate prison privatization, but they
are necessarily insufficient. Attempts to contract must reconcile the wide
discretion inherent in routine prison operation 1 with the longstanding ju-
dicial hostility to private, self-serving power delegations. The constitu-
tional concerns raised by the delegation of core prison disciplinary func-
tions cannot be allayed by attempting to use contractual regulation to
obviate judicial oversight of prison procedures; the courts' hostility to pri-
vate delegations demands more. For three reasons, strict contractual provi-
sions and enabling statutes will, at best, be only a buttress"2 to the devel-
opment of a new standard of judicial review.
87. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at A1S, col. 1 (quoting guard of private corporation operating
Immigration and Naturalization Service detention center as saying "I'm the Supreme Court"); supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
88. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
89. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982).
90. The Supreme Court has also found post-incarceration liberty interests that may not be de-
prived without constitutionally adequate standards in the area of prisoner transfers to mental hospi-
tals. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (requiring due process hearing).
91. In the closed world of the prison, see supra note 34, the absence of state regulation of any
aspect of institutional discretion amounts to a de facto grant of self-regulation to the private
contractor.
92. Strict contracts may complement heightened judicial scrutiny by guiding discretion. For exam-
ple, contracts should expressly provide-as do most state codes-for the automatic accrual of good
time conditioned only on good behavior, since the absence of such a provision might allow for punitive
or vindictive behavior by private personnel or might, even more dangerously, permit contractors to
maximize profits by increasing time served by inmates. Almost all the planned or existing private
prisons operate on a per-diem, per capita basis. CCA, for instance, charges $21 per day for each
prisoner it houses at its facility in Hamilton County, Tennessee. Tolchin,Jails Run by Private Com-
pany Force It To Face Question of Accountability, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at A15, col. 1. The
268 Center, a minimum-security correctional institution north of Pittsburgh, charges $35-37 per day
for each inmate. Mausteller & Twedt, Judge Orders 55 Inmates out of Private Jail by Tuesday,
Pittsburgh Press, March 16, 1986, at A10, col. 1. Similar strictures should also apply to parole,
disciplinary, and transfer hearings, with contracts expressly providing for state monitors at all signifi-
cant proceedings and for the procedural safeguards rejected in the Court's decisions (including the
provision of counsel) as added safeguards against profiteering abuse.
It would also be appropriate for managers and line officers at private prisons to take oaths of office,
as most correctional officials do now. Fenton Interview, supra note 15; Telephone interview with
Mary Woolley, Counsel, House Judiciary Committee, Pennsylvania State Legislature (Jan. 30,
1986). Pennsylvania's enabling legislation, H.307, P.N. 2460 § 7 (Pa. House 1985) does not require
oaths of office, although it does designate private correctional staff as "peace officers." Similarly, the
New Mexico legislature has explicitly empowered correctional employees to act as peace officers with
respect to arrests and law enforcement responsibilities within prisons. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-10
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First, contracts stipulating that government personnel be placed in
privatized facilities as monitors or even supervisors" might well reduce
the possibility of serious managerial abuse, but to the extent that institu-
tional discretion remains in private hands, either in the cellblock or in the
boardroom, these safeguards will do little to alleviate the concerns sur-
rounding private delegations." Of course, if supervision or monitoring ex-
pands to the point that public personnel are performing the core discre-
tionary functions, 95 the private delegation problem may be solved, but the
prison will no longer be a privatized one, or it will be one in which the
original quest for profitability and operational flexibility behind the priva-
tization has been entirely foregone.
Second, although the different attitude which the courts have taken to-
ward public and private entities exercising delegated discretionary author-
ity would seem to require that the standards enacted to guide that author-
ity should be different as well, there is currently no principle mandating
tough contracts since, unless the courts' adherence to a positivist entitle-
(Cum. Supp. 1986).
Explicit authorization or deputization could greatly increase the legitimacy of prison employees,
both in their own minds and in those of inmates, and would also ensure that the state has an interest
in closely monitoring prison standards since its liability profile would be heightened; sworn oaths of
office or formal deputization would eliminate any doubt about the presence of state action for pur-
poses of prisoners' rights litigation under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1982). Compare Ancata v. Prison Health
Servs., Inc. 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985) (county potentially liable for injury resulting from deliber-
ate indifference to medical needs of prisoner by private health care contractor since prison exclusive
government prerogative) and Langer v. Kendall, 721 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983) (city liable for actions
of private doctor hired by city to do autopsies pursuant to state law) and Medina v. O'Neill, 589
F.Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (Immigration and Naturalization Service officials liable for wrongful
death of illegal alien killed by negligent private guard) and Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
172 n.8 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (maintenance of police force a uniquely governmental func-
tion; delegation of this function to private party entails state action) with Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 841 (1982) ("Acts of . . . private contractors do not become acts of the government by
reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.") and Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (§ 1983 claim against private utility rejected since
provision of electricity not "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State").
93. Private prison advocates often make this suggestion. Telephone interview with Richard Crane,
CCA Vice-President for Legal Affairs (Nov. 23, 1985) [hereinafter Crane Interview]. For a thorough
discussion of the monitoring question, see Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitor-
ing Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353 (1986).
94. Moreover, even assuming that courts will find state action for purposes of § 1983 liability in
private prison cases, see supra note 92 (citing conflicting authorities); Note, Section 1983 and the
Independent Contractor, 74 Gao. L.J. 457, 469-79 (1985) (surveying narrowing of "public func-
tion" analysis and criticizing legal distinction between independent contractor and public employee),
the risk of government liability might prove less an incentive for strict public scrutiny than an encour-
agement to minimize state monitoring and deputization contacts or to seek such substantial indemnifi-
cation from the contractor that the enterprise collapses.
95. The fact that no current or proposed statute even remotely approaches this alternative is proof
enough of its impracticality. Pennsylvania's privatization bill, the strictest yet proposed, merely li-
censes inspectors and visitors. H. 307, P.N. 2460 §§ 10-11 (Pa. House 1985). No existing statute
envisions any continuous or even regular state presence in privatized facilities; the most frequent
inspection provided is biannual. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-4 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (biannual inspec-
tions); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 §§ 31, 460.3(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986) (specifying annual reports, but
no frequency of inspection).
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ment analysis is shaken, such safeguards are not constitutionally com-
pelled."8 In light of the expansion in prisoner rights litigation that more
comprehensive regulation (and, hence, a more comprehensive set of due
process entitlements) is likely to engender, 97 however, state officials will
be less than anxious to promulgate strict standards to limit private adjudi-
cative discretion. 98
Finally, the promulgation of strict contractual standards does not ensure
their prompt and effective implementation; much less can it guarantee
their continued force several years into the life of the contract, when legis-
lative scrutiny may have weakened and when corporate control of the
state's penal system may have reached the point that the government no
longer has the expertise, personnel, facilities, or fiscal resources to run the
prisons.
96. For example, though most states have granted inmates the right to an advocate at prison
disciplinary hearings, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), does not require such assistance; if a
private contractor decided to abandon the state practice, federal law would support him unless his
contract specifically constrained him to provide advocates.
In fact, the privatization standards enacted to date provide no more rigorous safeguards than those
which already constrain public prison officials, Fenton Interview, supra note 15, namely an adherence
to the vague guidelines provided by the American Correctional Association, see AMERICAN CORREC-
TIONAL ASS'N, PUBLIC CORRECTIONAL POLICY ON PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN CORREC-
TIONS (Ratified Jan. 20, 1985) (privatized services must "meet professional standards, provide
necesssary public safety, provide services equal to or better than government, and be cost-effective
compared to well-managed governmental operations"), and the minimal prescriptions laid down by
the Supreme Court. See supra notes 36-37, 41, 42 and accompanying text (discussing current
standards).
One grave concern not addressed by the American Correctional Association or by the Court's deci-
sions that warrants attention in private prison contracts is guard training and quality; inadequate staff
preparation may give rise to due process claims. Current training of public prison guards is, to be
sure, hardly satisfactory, see J. JACoBs, supra note 9, at 134, but it is nonetheless disturbing that
CCA, the largest and best capitalized of the private prison firms, provides its line personnel with a
40-hour training seminar only, Crane Interview, supra note 93, and that no state appears to have
mandated specific training requirements for the private sector. But see Woolley, Prisons for Profit:
Policy Considerations for Public Officials, 90 DICK. L. REV. 307, 324 (1985) (Pennsylvania priva-
tization legislation would establish mandatory training program for private prison guards).
This failure to mandate requirements is not surprising given that hiring guidelines are often mini-
mal in the public sector, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-11 (1986) (requiring that correctional
officers be citizens, of majority age, of good moral character, possess the equivalent of a high school
education and pass physical fitness and aptitude examinations), and that training for the public prison
guard is, as one leading commentator has put it, "the exception rather than the rule." J. JACoBS,
supra note 9, at 134.
97. See J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 9 & nn.22-23 (1985) (cit-
ing 350% increase in federal procedural due process claims from 1960's to 1970's; tracing this "explo-
sion" to Supreme Court's characterization of welfare benefits as more entitlement than "gratuity" and
requirement of procedural due process before termination); see also J. JACOBs, supra note 9, at 41
(noting 451.5% increase in prisoners' rights petitions filed in federal district courts between 1970 and
1979).
98. See Note, supra note 24, at 1022-23 (noting disincentives for administrators and legislators to
enact such standards).
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V. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN PRIVATE PRISONS: ESCAPING THE
POSITIVIST TRAP
The inability of contractual standards to safeguard inmates' rights ade-
quately in privatized prisons, combined with the financial bias of prison
firms and the sensitivity of the rights involved, places the courts in a cru-
cial regulatory role. First and foremost, the Supreme Court should, in the
private prison context, reconsider its positivist approach to due process
rights.99 Continued judicial reluctance to second-guess the judgments of
prison staff would ignore the danger that private prison operators will act
more abusively and arbitrarily than public officials. Leaving the creation
and adjudication of entitlements to profit-seeking entities without close
scrutiny cannot be equated with delegating these powers to public agen-
cies. Privatization without retention of adequate control is inconsistent
with the Court's own jurisprudence since an extension of positivism to
private prisons would directly contradict the consistent suspicion of the
Court toward for-profit delegations.
A reasoned application of nondelegation jurisprudence does not require
a ban on prison privatization, since the Court's holdings do not derive
from an Article I doctrine of per se invalidity.100 It does, however, require
heightened judicial scrutiny where matters of great concern to the state
and interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are being handed
over to private enterprise for the first time.
Such scrutiny must reflect a recognition that, regardless of the extent to
which they are designated as public officials, private prison personnel will
remain private employees.101 Courts must therefore mandate not only con-
siderably higher standards, but substantially less deferential review as
well.102 Measuring compliance with judicial decrees will be problem-
99. The term "positivist trap" is Professor Jerry Mashaw's. Mashaw, Due Process: The Quest
for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885 (1981) (referring to view that Constitution can permit
government to define interests with no safeguards against arbitrary discretion and yet not permit
government to define interests with only limited safeguards). See supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
100. This is not to say that some state courts might not apply a rule of facial invalidity to private
prisons, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, but merely to argue that, in this context, a disman-
tling of positivist prison jurisprudence would better accord with the due process/nondelegation princi-
ple as it has evolved in the modern administrative state. Moreover, even were a wholesale ban war-
ranted by earlier decisions, the political difficulty of implementing such a ban, see supra note 13,
combined with the Court's natural tendency to rule narrowly and on a case-by-case basis, would make
a tough, non-deferential approach more practicable.
101. If prison personnel remain on the government payroll though under private corporate man-
agement, as they do at the Butler County Jail, Fenton Interview, supra note 15, they nonetheless
operate under the supervision of a for-profit, rather than a nonprofit, entity. At the least, the stricter
standard of review proposed herein should apply in such instances to the discretionary activities of the
facility's management, few of which would be separable from the activities of line personnel.
102. It might be objected that a more intense standard of review for private prisons would violate
the equal protection rights of inmates in state-run facilities; prisoners might be treated better by jailers
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atic.105 Nonetheless, an explicit merger of due process and nondelegation
doctrines, long practiced by the courts in regard to other private delega-
tions, combined with judicial willingness to intervene in prisons, could
prevent privatization from worsening an already calamitous correctional
system.10
4
Abusive and arbitrary treatment, of course, is not limited to the extreme
and highly unlikely depredations of enslavement and corporal punish-
ment. Courts should be especially alert for more subtle deprivations, such
as improper revocation of good time, unwarranted tightening of internal
disciplinary and parole hearing procedures, arbitrary imposition of ad-
ministrative segregation and transfer, and increases in searches and
seizures, all of which might seem rational and efficient to private
contractors.
Rigorous judicial scrutiny may either undermine the truly private na-
ture of these facilities or undercut the economic advantages of privatiza-
tion by imposing prohibitively expensive constitutional requirements on
contractors. However, efficiency gains must not come at the expense of
process rights. If they do, then legislators and corrections officials will
have strong evidence that prison privatization was not the panacea it was
initially advertised to be.
Second, even if the Court refuses to qualify its approach in this new
area, it should be especially ready to invoke the "last resort" safeguards of
the First and Eighth Amendments. The recent trend away from "hands-
who know that their facility is being closely scrutinized. However, such an objection mistakes an
instrumental difference for a substantive one; as Hansmann's "distribution constraint" (see supra
notes 82-83) illustrates, heightened vigilance is required just to ensure that private, for-profit prisons
are as scrupulous as (not necessarily more scrupulous than) public ones. A harder judicial look at
private facilities would, therefore, constitute not special, but merely ameliorative, treatment.
It may be that the fall of positivism in this context would lead inexorably to the conclusion that
positivism in the public prison context must be discarded as well. Such a conclusion, however, is not
necessary to prove the point that positivism should be abandoned in the more limited area of private,
for-profit delegations. A rejection of deference in prison law as a whole would derive not from due
process-driven principles affecting private delegations but from objections to the wide discretion exer-
cised by public prison staff. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
103. See J. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 49, 53 (citing "ambiguity" of declaratory judgments, consent
decrees, and injunctions in prison cases and noting that courts may retain jurisdiction for several
years); AFTER DECISION, supra note 5, at 113-14 (noting that, although Holt litigation wrought
"broad and profound" changes in Arkansas prison system, conditions still remained "less than ideal").
104. Prolonged litigation, especially in Arkansas and Texas, has demonstrated the power of deter-
mined courts to oversee and implement prison reform. See Ruiz v. McCotter, No. H-78-987-CA (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 31, 1986) (federal judge holds state in contempt for violation of previous court decrees;
orders extensive reforms and improvements and submissions of detailed plans for compliance by April
1, 1987 on pain of compounding fines); Press, Inside America's Toughest Prison, TME, Oct. 6, 1986,
at 46, 50-52, 58-60 (discussing perseverance of federal judge in prison reform); cases cited supra note
19. In this endeavor, the appointment of special masters might well prove useful. See Note, "Master-
ing" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062, 1088-91 (1979) (offering suggestions for enhancing
effectiveness of masters in prison setting); see also Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:
The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30-35, 52-55 (1979) (noting unique ability and authority
of courts in structural reform litigation).
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on" adjudication in conditions of confinement cases,10 5 unfortunate enough
in the public sector, should certainly not extend to cases arising in the
private sector. An unwillingness to afford stricter process scrutiny need
not preclude heightened vigilance with regard to these other, and even
more fundamental, rights.
Third, the Court should insist that the state maintain control over adju-
dicative discretion-that any de facto adjudications performed by private,
for-profit entities be carefully limited and constantly reviewed. This might
involve the creation of an ombudsman with sufficient staff and resources
to implement guidelines that the courts and the legislature devise for key
discretionary functions, such as administrative segregation, disciplinary
hearings, good time and parole revocation, search and seizure, transfer,
and security classification.10 6 Moreover, prisoners' rights advocacy organi-
zations and other public interest groups should participate in review and
oversight. Their watchdog role will be more important in private prisons
since any relaxation in the vigilance of the courts or the political branches
could have grave consequences for private prison inmates and since the
state has clear disincentives for bringing cases which, under the state ac-
tion doctrine,10 7 are really against itself.
Fourth, to ensure that private regulation will be interstitial only, the
courts should insist that basic rulemaking be done only by appropriate
governmental entities. Fifth, as an added incentive for contractors to main-
tain adequate standards and safeguard prisoners' rights, the Supreme
Court should refrain from extending to private prisons its recent holdings
that preclude government liability for inmate harms caused by mere negli-
gence. 08 As Justice Blackmun noted in dissenting from this new doctrine,
in some endeavors, and especially in prison management, governmental
negligence can be an abuse of power implicating due process rights.109
This is especially true in privatized prisons, where profit-seeking creates
still greater potential for abuse. Absent such a reversal, however, state law
should expressly provide for liability of private guards in cases of mere
negligence. Finally, whatever doctrinal course the Supreme Court steers
in the area of prison law, the state courts should not abandon the more
105. See supra note 21.
106. Correctional ombudsmen have long proved successful in safeguarding prisoners' rights in
several Scandinavian countries and, more recently, have been appointed in a number of American
jurisdictions as well. G. HAWKINS, supra note 40, at 151, 155-56. See also W. GELLHORN,
OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERiS 147-51 (1966) (describing instances in which ombudsmen useful in recon-
ciling "disciplinary demands and inmates' interests"). An added virtue of a correctional ombudsman
would be his ability to relieve courts of many of their prison-monitoring duties. G. HAWKINS, supra
note 40, at 153.
107. See supra notes 92, 98.
108. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
109. Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 672-74 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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rigorous nondelegation standards they have long held, 110 and should find
prison privatization the ripest ground yet for invoking their traditional
concern over delegations to private, for-profit entities.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note does not dispute the poor state of American prisons today;
nor does it deny the potential utility of privatizing secondary services
within those prisons. At a minimum, however, if government abandons
direct day-to-day control of core discretionary functions, strict contractual
guidelines must be established and the deferential standard of judicial re-
view must be altered to provide for more intense scrutiny. These reforms
may eliminate the economic advantages that have impelled the privatiza-
tion campaign. Cost concerns, however, cannot be allowed to transcend
the state's duty to provide for those whom it has felt necessary to remove
from society. "The Constitution," as the Court noted in Stanley v. Illi-
nois, "recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." 1
110. See supra notes 56, 66 and accompanying text.
111. 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1971).
